Introduction
Even in the presence of mutually beneficial settlements, disagreement is pervasive. This difficulty in reaching agreements, commonly known as the Hicks paradox, has specially far-reaching consequences in those contexts where disagreement entails some sort of confrontation. In legal disputes, labor negotiations or international conflicts, a failure in striking a bargain provokes losses of time and money, output, equipment and human lives. It is not surprising then that understanding the bargaining process had become a key question in Economics.
Incomplete information about critical aspects of the negotiation environment (e.g. reservation price, trial value, military power) has been systematically invoked as an explanation for this puzzle 1 . The bargaining literature contains a plethora of models that have offered important insights following this approach 2 . One should, however, remain dissatisfied with the standard incomplete information explanation. Take for instance two parties who are about to engage in a conflict. It is plausible that the role of private information in preventing an agreement between them is much less important when their observable levels of strength are very unequal 3 . But we can often observe clearly small and weak countries or individuals fighting or litigating against much larger and powerful ones. We will here refer to this also 1 Of course, this does not need to be the unique explanation: Fernandez and Glazer (1991) show that delay can occur under full information too. 2 For a very exhaustive survey of the literature see Ausubel et al. (2002) . 3 See Blainey (1973) and Wagner (1994) .
pervasive phenomenon as the Uneven contenders paradox. 4 The present paper belongs to the economic tradition considering incomplete information as a powerful factor in negotiation processes. But it also explores a complementary, and perhaps more basic, line of enquiry: In order to understand how parties reach an agreement one should understand first how they disagree. A more careful analysis of the nature of disagreement reveals that conflict is part of the bargaining process and not only an alternative to it. This fresh look also offers new answers to the Hicks paradox and a consistent explanation to the puzzle of Uneven contenders.
In Section 2, we lay down the arguments that explain the role of conflict as a source of information and its use as a bargaining instrument. We conclude that if, due to its informative content, confrontation can be used as a negotiation tool, some patterns revealing this use should be found in the duration and termination of real conflicts. We then offer empirical evidence indicating the existence of such patterns by performing a duration analysis on a sample of colonial and imperial wars. The main message of this paper is thus that ordinary bargaining and confrontation are two sides of the same phenomenon. Rather than being substitutes, they are different tools that the bargaining parties have at their reach. Unions and countries engage in labor disputes or military conflicts because these are other forms of bargaining. Conflict will be pervasive as long as its returns as a bargaining instrument outweigh those of diplomacy.
2 Conflict as a bargaining instrument
The main argument
It is a bit surprising how the economic approach to disagreement still remains strongly tailored by Nash's seminal contribution. In his description of the bargaining problem, Nash (1950) embeds disagreement in the threat point, meant to be the outcome of a hypothetical non-cooperative game played after parties fail to agree on how to share the surplus of cooperation.
However, no information about that game or the forces that determine the location of such point is incorporated into the description of the problem.
Several arguments put forward by political scientists and sociologists suggest that economists should take a more careful look at the nature of disagreement. This exercise reveals two important facts.
First, the conflicts often following disagreement are driven by the relative power of the parties. Examples are the renegotiation of the terms of a contract between a soccer player and his club; the negotiations between two countries on the division of some piece of territory; between workers and management on wages; or simply how a just married couple will share the chores. When parties fail to agree in these contexts they can resort to coercive methods; they can go to court, they can go to war or strike; they can divorce. And although the outcomes of these conflicts are typically noisy, they depend on military strengths, the extent of the union membership or the quality of the lawyers. That is, they depend on power. Consequently, any sensible agreement will be conditioned by how the conflict ensuing disagreement is resolved. 5 Second, disagreement is not only an outside option. Parties actually choose the scope and intensity of the conflicts they fight when disagree: India and Pakistan have not used nuclear weapons, only engaged in skirmishes;
Pepsi and Coca-cola do not fight worldwide price wars, but only national; family arguments do not necessarily imply divorce. It was Clausewitz (1832) who first made this observation and who coined the concepts (that we borrow) of Absolute war, uniquely intended to the destruction of the enemy, 5 The economic literature has addressed this issue from a variety of perspectives: The papers by Horowitz (1993) , Anbarci et al. (2002) and Esteban and Sákovics (2002) admit that bargaining occurs in the shadow of disagreement. However, they fail to explain the actual occurrence of conflict mainly because they share a full information set-up. Other contributions, like Banks (1990) and Bester and Wärneryd (1998) , followed a mechanism design approach but treated conflict as final.
and Real war, "simply a continuation of political activity by other means."
This distinction is critical because after a limited (non-final) confrontation, bargaining can resume. Therefore, to assume that only all-out conflicts are possible prevents us to see that conflict is part of the bargaining process 6 .
Incomplete information plays a crucial role here because the imperfect knowledge of the opponent's strength turns limited conflicts into a bargaining instrument. This possibility was first noticed by Simmel (1904) , who pointed out that since power is not easy to measure, the most effective deterrent of conflict, the perfect revelation of relative strength, is only possible through conflict itself. In this vein, Blainey (1973) referred to war as "the stinging ice of reality" that helps to dissolve conflicting expectations about its own outcome. The logic of the argument is summarized in the following example: Suppose that two agents are uncertain about the strength of their opponent in case of conflict, and that both parties are "strong" but believe they are facing a "weak" rival. Then, no peaceful settlement can satisfy both of them and the result of the negotiation is inevitably total confrontation. But if parties can engage in a non-final conflict whose outcome is also determined by their relative power, it will convey information about the true balance of strengths and, perhaps, open the door to agreement.
Furthering this reasoning, Wittman (1979) noted that if conflict is a source of information, disagreement might occur even if there is no optimism.
A limited confrontation that makes the opponent revise her beliefs, can induce her to lower her demands. Hence, limited conflicts introduce delay when incomplete information does not preclude agreement but parties fight 6 With a few exceptions, economists have overlooked this point. Dasgupta and Maskin (1989) explored the effect of destructive power in bargaining in a model where parties can destroy parts of the bargaining set without terminating the game. In a similar spirit to ours, Cramton and Tracy (1992) presented a model in which unions can choose the intensity of the dispute by opting between strikes and holdouts.
in order to obtain advantage at the bargaining table. This double-edged effect of conflict in negotiations is the central point of the present paper. 7 
Illustrative evidence
We next present empirical evidence illustrating the arguments outlined above.
The aim of this exercise is to substantiate the claims put forward in the previous Section and to motivate the formal analysis of the next one.
If confrontation reveals information about the parties involved, some pattern in their duration and termination should indicate it 8 . Following this line of reasoning, our hypothesis here will be that whenever incomplete information is relevant, real conflicts should display an increasing hazard rate, that is, they should be more likely to end the more they last.
Two factors suggest that the probability of a dispute ending should increase over time. First, the returns of conflict as a bargaining tool should decrease as more skirmishes are fought because if standard Bayesian updating were employed, one additional victory would induce an increasingly negligible change in beliefs. Hence, as long as battles are costly or future rents discounted, there must exist a certain point in time from which no more lim- 7 In International Relations, Wagner (2000) incorporated both Clauswetiz's and Blainey's ideas into an incomplete information set-up but did not carry a full formal analysis. In Economics, Mnookin and Wilson (1998) provided a model of costly pretrial discovery, a procedure that, although is not a conflict avant la lettre, can be used as a signaling device by the discovering party. These authors explicitly chose not to consider this possibility in their model. 8 Several empirical studies have corroborated this point. Schnell and Gramm (1987) demonstrated the existence of a "learning by striking" phenomenon in wage negotiations, proved by the negative relation between lagged strike experience and the likelihood of further strikes. Box-Steffensmeier et al. (2003) showed that peace is more likely to break down between two states who fought a war that ended in a stalemate than when it did not and that this effect weakens over time. On the other hand, Goemans (2000) used a set of case studies from World War I to track how the estimates of several contenders about their relative strength evolved as fighting proceed. Setbacks forced them to lower their estimates whereas successes made them more optimistic and increased their demands. Interestingly enough, the author provides historical records proving that the German leadership explicitly designed their attack at Verdun not to decisively defeat the French but to influence France's estimate of its own relative strength. ited confrontations are worth fighting. On the other hand, in the long run, the more the parties fight the sharper their estimates of the true balance of strengths, and the closer they are to a complete information scenario where agreement is immediate. These observations lead to the conclusion that the use of confrontation as a bargaining instrument is a self-limiting phenomenon. This is equivalent to the concept of positive duration dependence in the language of duration analysis. 9 In order to investigate the possible existence of this pattern, we perform a duration analysis on a sample of 94 colonial and imperial wars that took place between 1817 and 1988. These wars were mainly caused by states aiming to expand and acquire new colonies or by dependencies trying to change their subordinate status. Hence, one can assume that the two sides were implicitly bargaining over a piece of territory or over the degree of autonomy of the non-state side. Our data come from the Extra-systemic wars dataset of the 3.0 Correlates of War (COW) project database (Sarkees, 2000) . Well-known examples of these disputes are the Boer wars, the Zulu wars, the Mahdi uprising and the Algerian war of independence. A summary of the cases considered and of the changes made on the original database can be found in the Appendix B.
Without entering into too many technical details (see Appendix B), this analysis estimates the hazard rate for these conflicts by taking war duration, measured in months, as the dependent variable. A logistic functional form for this rate is assumed and estimated. This function includes several time interactions in order to investigate how the hazard rate changes over time.
We do not intend to claim that the set of Extra-systemic wars as a whole displays an increasing hazard rate. After all, duration dependence is just theoretically unexplained variance. Instead, we must try to establish that any duration dependence found is due to the reasons conjectured.
If conflict was indeed used in order to change the opponents' beliefs and measures of such beliefs existed, their inclusion in the analysis would make duration dependence vanish (and the hazard rate flat). Given that such measures do not exist, we will use the termination mode of the conflict as a way to identify those cases whose hazard rate we expect to be increasing:
We classify the disputes in the sample depending on whether they ended or not with a negotiated agreement. We employ the type of ending as an Because we want to analyze different termination modes, we estimate a competing risks model, where one hazard rate is estimated for each type of ending, Agreement vs. No agreement. We follow Bennett and Stam (1996) and Ravlo et al. (2003) when constructing the set of variables to be included as controls. For simplicity we use the same vector covariates in both risks. A positive (negative) coefficient implies that the covariate increases (decreases) the corresponding hazard rate. Again, we refer the reader to Appendix B for details. Table 1 presents the results of the estimation of the single risk model (first column), that does not distinguish between the two termination modes, and of the competing risks model 10 . A quick examination of the log-likelihood 10 In the estimation of these models we employed the 6.4 version of TDA (Transition Data Analysis), developed by Blossfled and Rohwer (1995) . This software is specially designed shows that both models greatly improve upon the null one. The evidence however favors the competing risk approach: The data reject the hypothesis that the two cause-specific hazards are equal. 11 We ask the reader to concentrate on the coefficient of the time interaction for the two models. As hypothesized, wars that terminated in agreement display an increasing hazard rate, captured by the positive and significant coefficient of its time interaction 12 . The wars we identified as likely scefor Duration analysis and it is available at http://steinhaus.stat.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/. 11 The likelihood-ratio test statistic for this hypothesis is 2(
) where LCR and LSR are the log-likelihood of the competing risks and single risks models respectively. The term N ln 1 2 is the adjustment factor that allows the direct comparison between the two models. This statistic equals 21.417 and and has an associated p-value< 0.02. 12 We estimated several models with time interactions of higher order: There was no significative improvement when the quadratic and the cubic specifications were estimated. narios for the use of confrontation in bargaining, present positive duration dependence. On the contrary, those wars that ended in the total collapse of one of the parties display a flat hazard rate. On the other hand, the single risk model finds no duration dependence at all. This result suggests that the termination modes capture differences in the aims and conduct of wars that need to be controlled for. 13 The sharp differences in duration patterns uncovered by this analysis are consistent with the use of conflict in negotiations and support our initial hypothesis. The improvement made when moving from the single risk to the competing risks model indicates that the termination modes are supplying relevant information. On the other hand, the existence of positive duration dependence only in the case of the conflicts that ended in agreement indicates the presence of unexplained variance; a variance that is absent from the no agreement category where we did not expect conflict to be used as a bargaining instrument. 14 
The model
In the remainder of the paper, we explore a formal model that studies the role of conflict as a bargaining instrument. Its main ingredients are incomplete information and the coexistence of limited and final confrontations.
Consider a game, denoted by G [δ, θ] , where two risk neutral players bargain over the division of a cake worth one euro. We will assign to P1 the male gender and the female gender to P2. This game has two periods t = 1, 2. Players are impatient and discount the future at a common factor δ ∈ (0, 1]. There is a parameter p ∈ {p L , p H } denoting the relative strength of player P1 in case of confrontation and such that 1 > p H > p L > 0. P1 knows his own relative strength but it is unknown to P2, who believes at the beginning of the game that p = p H with probability offer of the share of the cake to P2. A is the option of Absolute Conflict that ends the game, and B means that a Battle between the two players is fought, making the game proceed to t = 2. In that period, the only available actions are {A, x(2)}, where x(2) is the share of the cake offered to P2.
P2 only moves if P1 makes an offer. In that case, her available actions are {Accept, Reject}. If P2 accepts, agreement is reached at that period.
Rejection triggers A.
An Absolute Conflict is a "fight to the finish", a confrontation in which both parties perfectly commit to defeat their opponent. 15 Therefore, it necessarily ends the game. We model this conflict as a costly lottery whose payoffs depend on the realization of p: With such probability P1 wins and P2 is defeated. This confrontation entails a fixed loss: The value of the cake reduces to 0 < θ ≤ 1. The payoffs from A, conditional on p, are thus
On the other hand, the Battle is a conflict of limited scope that does not entail the end of the game: Nature simply announces a winner and the second period is reached. The outcome of the Battle is a function of the relative strength p too. For simplicity, we will assume that P1's Battle winning probability is precisely p (and 1 − p for P2). 16 We will refer to the outcome of the Battle from P1's point of view, either
Notice that since p is unknown to P2, the outcome of the Battle conveys information about the true balance of strengths. 17 Offers constitute an additional source of information. They can be pooling, meanins that both types of P1 make them, or separating, in which case P1's true type is revealed. The key difference between these two sources of information is that whereas offers are typically used to misrepresent the own type, the outcome of the Battle is noisy but not subject to manipulation; it depends only on the parties' true relative strength.
Beliefs consist of a probability distribution µ(· | h(t)) over the set of types that depends on the history of the game h(t), that includes both the offers eventually made and the outcome of the Battle. At period t, P2's expected payoff from disagreement following history h(t) is thus
Note that if P2's beliefs after history h(t) make her too optimistic about her probability of winning A, the sum of the perceived disagreement payoffs may be greater than one and this renders agreement impossible.
Definition 1 Agreement is said to be feasible following history h(t) whenever the sum of (expected) disagreement payoffs does not exceed the size of the cake, that is, whenever
After rearranging (1) feasibility of agreement is given by
so the Loss ratio (Q) must exceed the difference between the actual and P2's expected value of p. As the Loss ratio increases even a very optimistic P2 does not expect to get much from A and agreement becomes feasible.
A strategy for P1 in this game is a function σ 1 (p) mapping the set of histories and types into the set of actions {A, B, x(1), x(2)}; similarly, a strategy for P2 is a function σ 2 mapping histories into {Accept, Reject}.
Now, one can apply the standard solution concept for this kind of games.
is a strategy profile (σ * 1 (p), σ * 2 ) and posterior beliefs µ(· | h(t)) such that σ * 1 (p) maximizes P1's continuation value of the game for each h(t) and for each type, P2 accepts x t if and only if x t ≥ E(d 2 | h(t)) and µ(· | h(t)) is consistent with σ * 1 (p) via Bayes' rule.
Characterization of equilibria
In this Section, we first discuss the benchmark version of the game above in which P1 simply makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to P2 and the Battle is not available. Then we characterize the PBE of the full-fledged game G [δ, θ].
In the last part of the Section, we compare these two games and discuss the role and effects of limited confrontation in bargaining.
The benchmark case
Suppose that the Battle is not available so any confrontation in the game is final. P1 can either trigger A or make a take-it-or-leave-it offer. This gives rise to two different type of equilibria, Separating or Pooling.
In a Separating equilibrium, the L-type makes a fully revealing offer. He can reveal his true type by making an offer x such that
because the H-type would never make it.
In a Pooling equilibrium, both types of P1 make the same offer. In this case, given the initial beliefs, the minimal acceptable offer is simply
In the next Theorem, we characterize the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game. Recall that under this solution concept we need to specify not only strategies but also P2's beliefs, including those off-the-equilibriumpath since Bayes' rule imposes no restriction on them. Throughout the paper we will support these PBE with the largest possible set of parameters by employing "optimistic" (from P2's viewpoint) beliefs when necessary.
Theorem 0 (Take-it-or-leave-it-game) In the one-period version of the game G [δ, θ] with no battle,
there is a Separating PBE in which the H-type triggers A, the L-type offers
and P2 accepts and holds
, then there exists a Pooling PBE in which both types of P1 offer x P and P2 accepts.
Proof. Given the previous discussion, the separating offer must be
because any offer to be accepted by P2 must satisfy
be sustained because the H-type prefers to settle rather than to trigger A.
He is better off by doing so even if he were to be confused with the Ltype. Hence, no off-the-equilibrium path beliefs can support a Separating equilibrium in that case.
On the other hand, the necessary and sufficient condition for the pooling offer to be an equilibrium is that the H-type must prefer to make it rather than to trigger A, that is
The main implication of this Theorem is that when no agreement is feasible, i.e. Q < 
Pooling by battles
We now analyze the PBE of the game G [δ, θ] . First, we show that the equilibria characterized in Theorem 0 still exist. In order to sustain them, we will employ the following "optimistic" beliefs
The following Corollary extends Theorem 0 to the full-fledged version of the game. 
there exists a Separating PBE in which at t = 1 the L-type makes an offer and the H-type triggers A.
(
, there exists a Pooling by offers PBE in which both types of P1 make the same offer at t = 1.
Note that the existence of these equilibria only depends on the value of Q and not on the discount rate δ.
Let us now focus our attention on the equilibria in which both types of P1 fight the Battle in order to alter P2's beliefs. The H-type is the one with more incentives to fight the Battle: It can help him to overcome the disadvantageous position he is in due to incomplete information. On the other hand, the weak type can obtain extra benefits by mimicking him, thanks to the noisy information transmitted by the Battle.
The second period of the game is final and then almost identical to the benchmark scenario; separating or pooling offers can again take place. These different equilibria will arise depending on who won the Battle. Intuitively, Victory gives more room to a pooling offer since the more pessimistic P2 is, the lower her minimal acceptable offer. Under Defeat however, P2 becomes more demanding and it is more likely that the H-type will prefer to trigger A instead. In that case, we should expect separation to prevail. Therefore, the occurrence of pooling or separation at t = 2 crucially depends on P2's beliefs after the Battle. Conditional on its outcome, they are simply
and
The importance of these beliefs will be made clear below.
In order to support the Pooling by battles profile as a PBE we will again employ "optimistic" beliefs 18 . So deviations from the equilibrium profile will convince P2 she is facing the weak opponent, that is
We are finally in the position of stating our main Theorem characterizing the Pooling by battles PBE. This characterization is made by means of the two parameters of the model, the Loss ratio, Q, and the discount factor, δ.
The discount factor becomes important here because if P1 is too impatient, he may prefer to take the outside option or settle immediately.
Theorem 1 (The Battle as a bargaining tool)
In the game G [δ, θ] and if P2 holds the optimistic off-the-equilibrium beliefs in (7):
there is a threshold discount rate δ such that if δ ≥ δ a Pooling by battles PBE with partial separation exists.
ii) For moderately high values of the Loss ratio (
there is a threshold discount rate δ such that if δ ≥ δ a Full pooling by battles PBE exists.
18 A different set of beliefs would not change qualitatively our results. These results offer an explanation for the pervasiveness of conflict in negotiations: The feasibility of agreement is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for a settlement to be reached. Limited or absolute confrontations will be observed not only when agreement is impossible but also whenever a settlement is feasible but the returns of resorting to conflict are higher than the returns from diplomacy.
Discussion

Further remarks
We have presented a simple model exploring the role of conflict as part of the bargaining process, a role, we believe, that is common to many contexts.
One of the main results derived from this model is the existence of a doubleedged effect of confrontation in negotiations, an effect that sheds new light on some of the most puzzling aspects of real disputes.
Regarding the Uneven contenders paradox, we argued that weak agents fight much stronger ones as a way of extracting better terms from them.
This happens even when these agents have little chance of victory in case of going to trial, engaging in a salvage strike or fighting an absolute war.
On the other hand, the puzzle that motivates the Hicks paradox comes from the definition of "mutually beneficial" agreements as those that dominate the outcome of an all-out conflict. This definition neglects that parties have other instruments available. An agreement may not be mutually beneficial when compared to what parties can get by fighting a skirmish that will affect their opponent's expectations. Rational agents will engage in limited confrontations whenever the returns from doing so are higher than the returns from "diplomacy".
Finally, some comments on robustness and extensions are in order. We have presented a stylized view of real-world negotiation processes that is hence potentially subject to multiple criticisms. One set of objections refers to the two-point support of the type space, the other to the particular structure of moves and information selected. Yet, we think that the simplicity of the ideas behind our model make it robust to these plausible concerns. The reader may also argue that by assuming that every offer is final we avoid further signalling through rejected P1's offers. We claim that this is assumed without loss of generality: If P2 also had the option of rejecting the offer and triggering a battle, all offers would be either uninformative or accepted in equilibrium. Any informative offer would make P2 more optimistic. Therefore, P1 cannot gain anything from such offer.
Another modification would be to switch roles so the uninformed party is the one who makes offers. This would lead to a scenario where battles are used to screen the opponent rather than as a signaling device. This is a very interesting possibility that we intend to explore in future research. A further extension to a two-sided incomplete information framework does not seem to add enough insights to compensate the cost of increasing complexity. 
A Appendix
Theorem A In the game G [δ, θ] there exist two threshold discount rates δ and δ such that
is a Pooling by battles PBE with partial separation in which P2
then there exists a Pooling by offers PBE in which P2 accepts x P (1) and her beliefs are 
Proof. In order to prove this Theorem, let us first consider all the possible actions that both types of P1 can take at period t = 1. a) L-type triggers A: It is easy to see that for the L-type, triggering A is always a dominated action. He could instead offer θ(1 − p L ) and end up better off since P2 will accept that offer. b) L-type makes an offer : If the H-type makes an offer too, it is easy to see that it must be the same offer (the two-type assumption precludes the construction of a fully revealing schedule of offers). Hence, we are in the Pooling by offers scenario (case (ii)). This profile can be supported as an equilibrium when condition (3) holds because the optimistic beliefs ensure that if P1 deviates from this profile he will get at most
The second option is the separating profile in which the L-type makes an offer and the H-type triggers the Battle. This one cannot be sustained as a PBE. Notice first that it would require the L-type not to mimic and
But the H-type should not prefer to offer θ(1−p L ) because it is always accepted, and this requires exactly the opposite condition! Hence, a two-period separation of types cannot be a PBE.
It only remains to consider the case where the L-type makes an offer and the H-type triggers A (case (iv)). We must check that it is not in the interest of the H-type to trigger the Battle even if P2 holds optimistic beliefs; that is, we need to check that
But the existence of a Separating equilibrium does not only need this condition to hold true. This profile cannot be an equilibrium when Q ≥ p H − p L since the H-type would be better of by offering θ(1 − p L ) at t = 1 than by fighting A (P2 will always accept that offer). Notice however that
implying that the restriction on δ has no bite in this region. Therefore, only the condition Q < p H − p L must be met in order to support a Separating PBE. c) L-type fights the Battle: First we show that if the Battle is fought both types must do so. Suppose the H-type makes an offer instead. Then the weak type would be better off by mimicking him. Suppose now that the H-type triggers A but the L-type fights the Battle; for this separation to be sustainable, the H-type should not prefer to fight the Battle as well. This
We know that this restriction has bite only when Q > p H − p L , but in that case it is not optimal for the H-type to trigger A since he would prefer to offer θ(1 − p L ). Therefore, both types must trigger the Battle. This is the Pooling by battles profile.
Now we obtain conditions that support Pooling by battles as a PBE of the game. Let us derive the pooling offers under both outcomes V and D.
Given beliefs (5) and (6), one can compute the minimal acceptable offers for P2 under each outcome. Under V this offer is
whereas under D it is
Note that x V (2) < x D (2). It is immediate to see that for Pooling to be sustainable, both types must prefer to make the minimal acceptable offer ( 
pooling cannot be supported and separation occurs under both V and D.
Proof. Let us consider the two possible outcomes of the Battle. Under V, both types will prefer to make the offer x V (2) if and only if
that can be rewritten into
This condition is equivalent to (2) under this outcome. Similarly, under outcome D we need
that note that again coincides with the condition on the feasibility of agreement under D.
We also need P1 not to be so impatient he prefers to trigger A. Formally, Proof. We saw above that when
under both outcomes of the Battle because the H-type prefers A to the pooling offer. Given this, H-type's optimal action is to trigger A at t = 1.
Hence, the first necessary condition for Pooling by battles to prevail is Q ≥
Once in this region, if
because straightforward algebra shows that if condition (8) holds for type H so it does for the type L. Note that
This threshold is decreasing and convex in Q.
When there is pooling at both states
because again, only the condition for the H-type needs to be checked. Note that δ 3 < 1 in this area. This threshold is also decreasing and convex in Q.
Simple computations show that
There are two deviations from the Pooling by battles profile:
triggers A in the first period; we already dealt with this possibility in Lemma Proof. When optimistic beliefs are used, the type with the most incentives to deviate is the L-type since the condition
Hence, new thresholds on the discount rate are needed. When there is separation under D the new condition is
when there is pooling under both outcomes. Both thresholds are increasing and concave in Q. Easy algebra shows that δ 2 > δ 4 for any Q.
These conditions are summarized as follows:
so if the discount rate is high enough and P2's beliefs are optimistic, neither of the two possible deviations, either A or an offer, can beat the Pooling by battles profile.
B Appendix
B.1 Methodology
The duration of events can be seen as a random variable T with its own distribution function 20
specifying the probability that an event lasts less or equal than t. Symmetrically, the survivor function
is the probability that the duration will exceed t.
The main object of interest when studying duration dependence is the hazard rate
where f (t) is the density function of T. The hazard rate is thus a conditional density function. An event is said to exhibit positive (negative) duration dependence when its hazard rate increases (decreases) with duration.
We employ a competing risks model in order to investigate multiple termination modes. We consider two risks depending on whether contenders reached a settlement, coded as s, or one of the sides was totally defeated, coded as ns. Two risk-specific hazard rates
are estimated, where observations whose termination mode is different from r are treated as censored at the point of termination.
Assuming that risks are independent, the overall hazard becomes
The parametric estimation procedure assumes either a functional form on f (t) or a particular specification of the hazard rate directly, and then estimates λ(t) by maximum likelihood. The latter is the common practice in discrete-time analysis like the one we perform in this paper 21 . In particular, 21 We have some reservations against continuous-time specifications: (i) they often impose strong distributional assumptions on the hazard rate; and, more importantly, (ii) the data on wars are typically discrete. On the other hand, the Cox semiparametric specification imposes fewer restrictions than ours on the shape of the hazard rate because it is not directly estimated. But this feature makes this model less valuable when duration dependence is the main object of interest.
we assume that the hazard rate takes the logistic functional form λ r (t) = 1 1 + exp −(α r X r + β r t) r = s, ns,
where X r is a vector of cause-specific covariates and α r is the vector of associated coefficients. Duration dependence is captured by cause-specific coefficient β r . This model is thus quite flexible: Contrary to other specifications (like Weibull) it does not restrict the hazard to be monotonic.
B.2 The data
The 3.0 COW Extra-systemic dataset contains 109 military disputes 22 . We dropped 16 cases due to the lack of information about some covariates.
There is an ongoing debate regarding the inclusion of several conflicts (and the exclusion of others) in the database. We wanted to remain neutral in this issue so the only change we made in the composition of the sample, following
Clodfelter (1992), Dupuy and Dupuy (1993) and Goldstein (1992) , was to split the Franco-Dahomeyan war into two conflicts. Table 3 below contains all the cases included in the analysis.
We take one observation per war, measured at the start of the conflict.
We believe that this does not seriously limit our analysis. If time-varying covariates were employed, they would not change much over time because most of them are annual measures. Moreover, as Bennett and Stam (1996) argue, the present approach allows us to predict the duration and termination mode of a conflict in a similar way to the involved parties since this was the information available to them when the war began.
This dataset makes the construction of dyadic variables difficult. Measures of relative strengths or the contenders' regime-type match are not available due to the lack of information about the non-state sides. When needed, we solve this problem by assuming that all non-states were identical in a certain characteristic. While this is a strong assumption in some dimensions, it is not that implausible in others: Although not all the non-states had the same regime-type, they were mostly perceived as non-democratic by the democratic states fighting them (see Ravlo et al., 2003) .
The variables employed in the analysis are:
The data from the COW dataset was cross-checked with Clodfelter (1992) and Dupuy and Dupuy (1993) . When divergences appeared, we gave priority to these sources since they are more accurate 23 . When the start or end date where not precise, we took the average of the maximum and minimum possible durations.
Agreement:
The sources are Clodfelter (1992), Dupuy and Dupuy (1993) and Goldstein (1992) . Following the criteria employed 24 , 45 out of the 94 cases considered ended in a settlement.
Average deaths: We proxy the cost of continuing conflict with the nonstate's monthly average of thousands of battle casualties. The data come from the COW database, Clodfelter (1992) and Lacina and Gleditsch (2005) . 25 Stable democracy: There is evidence showing that democracies and autocracies wage war differently. Democracies are less likely to support long wars because the costs to their leaders increase over time (due to the exis- 23 The original COW records were quite inaccurate probably because the interest of scholars has been almost exclusively centered in the Interstate wars database. 24 We consider that a war did not end in agreement when the state completely withdrew due to a military defeat, when it stormed the capital of the opponent, or the latter totally lost its autonomy or its population was annihilated. Even very unfavorable settlements for the losers, like the acceptance of a protectorate status, are coded as agreements. Results do not change if these less clear-cut cases were coded as ending in no agreement. 25 The inclusion instead of the state's average deaths yields almost identical results. Relative strength: Under the assumption of equal-strength across the non-state entities, measures of the state' strength can be considered as proxies for the dyadic concept of relative power. We follow Bennett and Stam (1996) and include:
(i) Population: Measures the state's population in hundred of millions. 27 (ii) Military personnel: Measures the state's total military personnel in millions of soldiers. 26 The basis of this measure is the widely used Polity IV Democracy score running from 0 to 10 (Marshall and Jaggers, 2000). We are aware of the potential flaws of any measure of Democracy. The Polity score focuses only on the "institutional" characteristics of a democracy and does not record other important elements like the extent of the suffrage. Within this limits, it is nevertheless a consistent measure, available for most countries since 1800. We used +3 as the cut-off to describe a state as democratic. 27 A sharper indicator woud have been military-age population. However, such data was not available. The inclusion of urban population instead had no impact in the results. Previous disputes: Counts the number of disputes between the two sides in the 25 years before the war. We conjecture that more disputes make further conflicts shorter because part of the "learning" process is already done.
Hence, we expect more disputes to be associated with shorter durations. 
